← Sample Reports

Meridian Advisory Group is a Southeast-focused HR and organizational consulting firm generating between $3M and $7M in revenue with EBITDA in the $500K–$1M range — a profile that puts it squarely in the awkward middle for professional services acquisitions. The founder brings institutional credibility from 18 years of Fortune 500 HR leadership, which likely anchors the firm's brand and referral network but raises immediate questions about transferability.

Revenue mix includes a meaningful recurring component in the 50–74% range, which is above average for consulting but still leaves a significant transactional tail. The firm is small — nine total headcount including contractors — which means this is a people-and-relationships acquisition, and the diligence will center almost entirely on whether those people and relationships survive a transaction.

Archetype: Clean Exit. The stated motivation — selling from strength with strategic timing — combined with the founder's posture of active involvement but operational delegation signals a founder who has built the business to a stable plateau and wants to monetize before either the market shifts or personal energy declines.

This is the cleanest archetype for buyer negotiations because it suggests rational decision-making rather than desperation, but buyers will immediately test whether "timing feels right" means the founder sees a ceiling on growth or has line of sight to client losses. The absence of a stated post-transaction intent is notable — buyers will want to know within the first conversation whether the founder envisions a 12–24 month transition, a consulting arrangement, or a clean break.

Meridian operates in the broad HR consulting and organizational advisory market — fragmented at the lower end and dominated by the Big Four, Korn Ferry, Mercer, and mid-market specialists at the upper end. A Southeast-focused boutique with $3M–$7M in revenue occupies a niche that is defensible against nationals on price and relationships but vulnerable to any regional competitor who can replicate the founder's Fortune 500 pedigree and referral network.

The 50–74% recurring or contracted revenue is a genuine strength — most boutiques in this size range report 20–40% recurring. A buyer will want to understand the precise composition: is the recurring revenue from retainer-based advisory relationships, annual compensation benchmarking cycles, or multi-year change management engagements? Each has a different risk profile. The top customer at 10–20% of revenue is manageable but sits right at the threshold where SBA lenders and PE buyers start scrutinizing concentration risk.

The two senior consultants with 6+ years of tenure are the most valuable assets in the business after the client book. However, "manage relationships" and "own relationships" are different things — a buyer will test whether those consultants can independently retain clients post-close. Documentation is described as well-maintained, which is above average at this revenue scale and will help in diligence.

• Client relationship ownership — buyers will conduct client-by-client analysis to determine whether each top-10 relationship is held by the founder, the two senior consultants, or is truly institutional. They may interview clients directly and ask: "If the founder were no longer involved, would you continue working with Meridian?"
• Senior consultant retention and incentive alignment — two senior consultants manage most client relationships but have no equity and apparently no retention mechanism. A buyer will view this as a critical gap and will likely require retention agreements or equity grants as a condition of close.
• Recurring revenue definition — a buyer will decompose the 50–74% figure to understand whether "recurring" means auto-renewing contracts, annual re-engagements requiring active re-selling, or long-term projects spanning multiple years. The difference is significant in how forward cash flows are underwritten.
• Founder's post-close role — with no stated post-transaction intent, a buyer will probe aggressively on how long the founder is willing to stay, in what capacity, and at what cost.
• Quality degradation specifics — "revenue continues but quality suffers" is an honest but alarming assessment. Buyers will want to understand exactly what degrades: client communication, deliverable quality, business development follow-through, or strategic advisory depth.
• New business pipeline — with new business coming exclusively from referrals, a buyer will question scalability and whether the referral network is founder-dependent or distributed across the team.
• Lease expiration — a 14-month lease creates an operational decision a buyer will inherit. They will want to understand facility requirements, renewal options, and costs.
• Key employee departure risk — the acknowledgment that 1–2 departures would be serious means retention costs will be built directly into the deal model.

Meridian's moat is its people and their embedded client knowledge — not its brand or credentials. Customer relationships with 5+ year tenure represent real switching costs because the advisor develops deep institutional knowledge of the client's compensation philosophy, organizational politics, and talent strategy. However, this moat is only as durable as the individuals who hold the relationships. Licenses and certifications in HR consulting are table-stakes credentials, not barriers to entry.

On AI exposure: compensation benchmarking is being rapidly automated by platforms like Payscale, Salary.com, and Carta Total Comp. This does not eliminate the advisory layer, but it compresses the billable hours associated with analytical work. Org design and change management are more insulated — these require political navigation, stakeholder management, and contextual judgment that AI cannot replicate. The net impact is downward pressure on revenue per engagement for analytical service lines, requiring a strategic shift toward higher-value advisory work.

Meridian's leverage is most vulnerable in three areas. First, the absence of inbound interest means there is no competitive tension — a single-buyer process against a sophisticated acquirer will result in buyer-favorable terms on earnout structure, working capital targets, and holdback provisions. Creating a structured process with multiple qualified buyers simultaneously is essential. Second, the unresolved question of equity for the two senior consultants creates uncertainty a buyer will exploit. Third, the 14-month lease expiration creates a ticking clock that adds friction and cost to a buyer's day-one model.

At $3M–$7M in revenue and $500K–$1M in EBITDA, Meridian sits in a buyer universe that includes funded search fund operators, independent sponsors, small PE platforms executing professional services roll-ups, and adjacent operators — larger HR consulting firms, staffing companies, or benefits advisory firms — seeking to add organizational consulting capabilities.

The most likely buyer is either a PE-backed HR services platform looking for a Southeast tuck-in or a search fund operator with relevant industry experience who can replace the founder's strategic role over a 12–24 month transition. The least likely buyer is a passive financial investor or lifestyle buyer — this business requires active management and client-facing involvement, and the thin management bench means a hands-off owner would see rapid degradation.

Strategic acquirers at the national level — Mercer, Korn Ferry, Aon — are unlikely at this revenue scale unless Meridian has a unique client roster or capability filling a specific gap in their Southeast coverage. The buyer who pays the best price will be the one who sees Meridian as solving a specific geographic or capability gap in their existing platform — not the one who discovers it in a passive search.

This report was generated solely from the information provided in a fictional intake submission. No independent verification, financial review, or external research was conducted. This report reflects the M&A judgment framework of Mike Ye across 25 years and $7.4B of acquisitions, divestitures, and portfolio exits across media, healthcare services, retail, and technology. For advisory on your specific process, visit mikeye.com. Not legal, tax, investment, or valuation advice.